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SPACES OF FREEDOM FOR CITIZENS AND
ASYLEES IN THE EU AND U.S.'
The author, Francis J. Conte, professor of law and former dean at the
University of Dayton School of Law, died in late March of 2011 after
a brief illness. This article was completed shortly before his death
and is his last in a long list of publications written over his 34 years
as a professor and dean. This article is published posthumously in
his memory.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In one part of the European Union ("EU"), desperate refugees
about to reach shore may be chased back into the sea.2 Yet in another
I I would like to thank Dean Lisa Kloppenberg of the University of Dayton School
of Law for her encouragement and the generous grant in support of my work.
2 Greek officials have been observed in the sea, chasing and otherwise forcing
people from Somalia and Middle East hot spots, notably Iraq, seeking refuge from
landing on Greek shores. See Greece: Iraqi Asylum Seekers Denied Protection,
Human Rights Watch (Nov. 26, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/11/25/
greece-iraqi-asylum-seekers-denied-protection [hereinafter Greece: Iraqi Asylum
Seekers]; Greek Coast Guard officials have been reported to be pushing . . .
"migrants out of Greek territorial waters, sometimes puncturing inflatable boats or
otherwise disabling their vessels." Id. (quoting Stuck in a Revolving Door: Iraqis
and Other Asylum Seekers and Migrants at the Greece-Turkey Entrance to the
European Union, Human Rights Watch, 43-45 (Nov. 2008), http://www.hrw.
org/sites/default/files/reports/greeceturkeyll08 webwcover.pdf (detailing various
personal accounts of Greek authorities puncturing rubber boats or otherwise
disabling vessels); see also Observations on Greece as a country of asylum, Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 4 (Dec. 2009), http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4b4b3fc82.pdf (noting that incidents involving Greek
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part of the EU, substantial percentages of undocumented non-citizens
meet international legal standards and are granted asylum.3
In China, thousands of desperate North Koreans live in and
travel across the vast country, often in disguise, fearing recognition
and return to a brutal environment; yet Chinese leaders, including
academics, deny the existence of asylum seekers in their land.4
In the U.S., while the asylum process is relatively well-
known, and the standards and criteria for granting asylum are
reasonably well agreed upon, people in similar 5 circumstances are
often treated differently merely because of the location of the
immigration office or court.6 The decision to grant asylum is a matter
officials puncturing rubber boats and removing engines and oars have been
reported). An acceptance rate of .05% out of 20,000 applications for asylum
tends to reinforce the notion of resistance to asylum seekers by Greek authorities.
See Bill Frelick, Greece's Refugee Problem, Human Rights Watch (Jul. 31, 2009),
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/31/greeces-refugee-problem.
3 Sweden, for example, hosted 18,000 Iraqi asylum seekers in 2007. Its general
asylum recognition rate is approximately 50%, roughly the same rate as Italy.
Sweden seems to base their asylum policies on generally accepted international
standards, and tends to be more generous than most countries. Hemme Battjes,
Taking Forward Asylum Policy in the EU: The Legal Implications of the 2008
Commission Policy plan on Asylum, Address at the Third Forum on EU
Immigration and Asylum Policy (Nov. 13, 2008).
4 When the author gave a lecture to PhD students and faculty at Renmin University's
Faculty of Law in Beijing, China, in June 2007, a faculty member and former
international judge stated that the need for a consistent and transparent process for
adjudicating asylum claims in China was not pressing because there were hardly any
refugees or asylees in China. A Korean PhD student interrupted him to declare that it
was well-known that there were over 40,000 desperate people who had in recent
times escaped to China from North Korea. Many of these North Koreans, due to the
fear that Chinese authorities would pick them up and send them back to North Korea
without any consideration of the persecution they would suffer upon return,
disguised themselves and lived in wretched conditions. Some engaged in prostitution
and illicit activities to get by; others tried to cross China to seek refuge elsewhere.
5 Historically, refugees from countries unfriendly to the U.S., as in communist states,
were more likely to be welcome while those fleeing tyranny in non-communist
states, such as Haiti or Columbia, were less likely to be granted asylum status.
6 See generally JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ, & PHILIP G.
SCHRAG, REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 17-60 (2009).
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of some discretion, 7 and some newcomers, for example women
fleeing abusive cultural practices, are seldom welcomed at all.8 The
oppression of women and girls, for what may be deemed "mere"
cultural or religious reasons, rarely seems to qualify for asylum.
Likewise, Iraqis who are in jeopardy of persecution because of their
overt support for the U. S. military and U.S military action in Iraq, or
U.S. policies, ironically and sadly, were unlikely to be welcomed to
U.S. shores.9
On the other hand, in some EU states in economic crises, such
as Greece, the economic well-being, and the social stability of nation-
al citizens may be perceived to be in jeopardy, perhaps aggravated by
substantial migration of non-citizens to a nation-state. The safety,
national security and the society of a respective nation-state seems to
some to be threatened, 10 and for this reason the state's limited and
depleting resources cannot be spared for uninvited non-citizens. It
7 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000); see also DAVID
A. MARTIN ET AL., FORCED MiGRA TIOALA WAND POLICY 161-171 (2007).
8 In In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. en banc 2008) the Board of
Immigration Appeals granted the claimant asylum due to the applicant's female
gential mutilation, which provided such exceedingly narrow standards as to make
them virtually applicable only to her case. Likewise, in Fatin v. INS 12 F.3d 1233
(1993) the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused to grant asylum to a
woman who resisted oppressive and discriminatory fundamentalist Islamic cultural
practices in Iran.
9 In 2005, the U.S. allowed only 202 Iraqi refugees into the United States. However,
under increasing pressure, U.S. authorities agreed to allow 7,000 refugees in 2007.
Bill Frelick, Iraqis Denied Right of Asylum, (May 2007) (unpublished dissertation,
Human Rights Watch) (available at www.fmreview.org/textOnlyContent/FMR/Iraq/
Frelick.doc).
10 Greece, for example, has recently been undergoing an economic crisis, which
along with its geographic vulnerability, its proximity to the thousands of refugees
fleeing Middle Eastern states, may account for some of its resistance to more
generous sharing of its resources. See Timeline: Greece's Economic Crisis,
REUTERS, Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6124EL20100203.
But as part of the E.U., Greece has a very decent standard of living, and its $32,000
per capita annual income and recent 10. 6% unemployment rate for November 2009,
suggest that Greek citizens have not been that much harder hit than many in the
recession of 2008-09. See also http://news. Bbc.co/2hi/8510386.stm.
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must be reserved for their citizens and others lawfully residing in
these states in order to weather the severe economic turbulence.1
Genuine fears of threats to national and cultural identity, and
the potential dilution of national and cultural values in some EU
states12 and the U.S.,13 and concerns about physical security14 are
leading to national policies and proposals that compel conformity
and assimilation by Islamic and Latin American migrants and
immigrants to national, cultural, and social values or official use of
11 Id See also Greece: Unsafe and Unwelcoming Shores, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
Oct. 12, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/86025.
12 In the Netherlands, Lilianne Ploumen, the Dutch Labor Party's chairperson,
representing a party and a people noted for tolerance of difference and different
ideas, recently issued a position paper calling for an end to the failed Dutch model of
"tolerance" and for requiring Arabs and Turks living in the Netherlands to conform
to Dutch society's social standards, to let go of "the grip of the homeland" and to
take responsibility for the Netherlands, "to cherish and protect Dutch essence". See
John Vinocur, From the Left, a Call to End the Current Dutch Notion of Tolerance,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/29/world/
europe/29iht-politicus.3.18978881.html. Much of this concern has been inspired in
the context of the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S., the
assassinations in the Netherlands by resident Islamist radical extremists of Pym
Fortuyn, leader of a revolt against Muslim immigrants and filmmaker Theo Van
Gogh for making what was perceived by some Islamists as a blasphemous film
depicting the life of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali woman who was a member of the
Dutch Parliament and an outspoken critic of radical Islam, who herself left the
Nethlerlands under constant threats to her life by such Islamists in the Netherlands.
These events, coupled with the habit of the Arab and Turkish communities (about
6% of Netherland's 16 million people) of isolating themselves on islands of their
traditional life (men refusing to shake hands with women; Islamic women in burqas,
etc.) has caused such communitie to be perceived often as hotbeds of criminality and
trouble-making.
13 See generally Leah Sullivan, Press One for English: To Form A More Perfect
Union, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 589 (2009) (describing the arguments for and against
making English the Official language of the United States, and discussing various
legislation); Josh Hill, Devin Ross, Brad Serafine & Richard E. Levy, Watch Your
Language! The Kansas Law Review Survey of Official-English and English-Only
Laws and Policies, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 669 (2009) (discussing the various legislative
approaches of multiple states and the issues raised with regard to making English the
official language of the United States).
14 Vinocur, supra note 12.
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the nation's predominant language.15 Violence, crimes, and drug
smuggling go hand in hand with illegal border crossing in the U.S.,
and this fact is often noted by leading public figures. The southern
border of the U.S. is seen as porous, contributing greatly to the
growth of a population of about 12 million undocumented migrants
and immigrants, consisting mostly of Latin Americans. Many U.S.
citizens express their fear for the survival of their national and
cultural identity;16 some for their physical security17.
National citizens in all historically migrant and immigrant
receptive states, such as the U.S, which accepts the most immigrants
and asylees worldwide each year,18 Canada,19 and the EU, who are
now also adversely affected by economic turbulence, uncertainty and
insecurity, demand economic, social, cultural and physical protection
from outsiders from their respective states. They see their own needs
as their foremost priority, including the need to be protected from
" See generally Sullivan, supra note 13; Hill et. al., supra note 13; Vinocur, supra,
note 12; see also Home v. Flores, 129 S. Ct 2579, 2587 (2009). Also, recently the
Dutch Labor Party, the largest party of the left in the Netherlands, issued a white
paper and proposal to combat the "'loss and estrangement' felt by Dutch society
facing parallel communities that disregard its language, laws and customs." See
Vinocur, supra, note 12. Radical Islamist assassinations of and threats to major
Dutch figures, street crime, and Islamist cultural insulation from Dutch society have
led to the paper. Lilianne Ploumen, the party's chair, stated that 'immigrants must
"take responsibility for this country" and cherish and protect its Dutch essence'. Id.
16 See generally PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE DEATH OF THE WEST (St. Martin's
Press 2002).
17 The overflow of Mexican drug wars threatening the physical security of
Americans on both sides of the border have been well documented. See, e.g., Paul J.
Weber, In Texas, Fear Follows Mexicanos Who Flee Drug War, EL PASO TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2010; Ana Campoy, In El Paso, Mexican Violence is Never Far, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 17, 2010.
18 MARTIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 90-95.
19 The ordinarily generous Canadians, often criticized for the liberality of their
application of asylum standards, have in these recent tough economic times taken
some harsh stances due to large numbers of asylum claimants from Mexico, e.g.,
Press Release, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (July 13, 2009), http://www.
cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2009/2009-07-13.asp, and Romas from
the Czech Republic, e.g., Peter O'Neil, Canada Flooded with Czech Roma Refugee
Claims, http://www.canada.com/news/Canada+flooded+with+Czech+Roma+refugee
+claims/1499804/story.html.
2010
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largely 'foreign' 20 threats. While most citizens should surely
recognize that the likely temporary economic problems are brought on
largely by domestic institutions and factors, voices, spurred on by
momentary passions, often political, are raised against the involve-
ment or meddling of non-domestic entities. These foreigners and
outsiders are frequently the source of blame. The undoubted focus of
the citizenry of traditionally migrant-receiving states is to husband
resources for national citizens, and to prevent their distribution
beyond their borders and to those unlawfully residing within their
borders.21
In these respects national citizens are in effect calling upon
their states and governments to exercise the responsibilities of the
sovereign, to protect the health, security, economic well-being, and the
cultural and national identity of citizens, in order to preserve a secure
nation, protected within its borders. They are holding their states to
their sovereign responsibility to secure the nation's borders by
ensuring the economic well-being, health, security, and the national
and cultural identity, of their national citizens. These responsibilities
are indeed, at bottom, essential attributes of sovereignty-the
protection of national citizens. These attributes are part of the people's
20 The adjective 'foreign' is used here, rather than merely 'external,' to denote
the palpable sense that such threats come from sources different and sometimes
alien to perceived internal values.
21 Protectionist "Buy America" provisions in President Obama's Stimulus
Package reflect this fortress mentality, sometimes justified by those one would
assume know better. See Scott Horsely, Buy-American Stimulus Provision
Sparks Debate, NPR (Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyld-100212839. For example, Nobel Prize winning economist Paul
Krugman has stated that because the world economy is so large that for effective
U.S. economic stimulus it must focused upon our economy. See Dave Johnson,
Stimulus Package's Buy America Clause in the News, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(August 10, 2009, 5:22 PM) http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/dave-oohnson/
stimulus-package-buy-ame b 255971.html. In Norway, for example, one might
fimd in food stores signs like "Norwegian Cucumbers are Best" or containers of
Norwegian milk carrying the Norwegian flag. Oivind Fuglerud, Inside Out: The
Reorganization of National Identity in Norway, in SOVEREIGN BODIES:
CITIZENS, MIGRANTS AND STATES IN THE POST-COLONIAL WORLD 291, 292
(Thomas B. Hansen & Finn Stepputat eds., 2005).
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essential connection to its community and its space, without which
the nation-state system, in its current form, and the billions of people
relying on it, could drift into a global anarchy in their respective
states. 2
2
Although the perceptions of citizens often translates into their
reality, tough times, such as the recent recession, though "tough", are
in reality temporary economic downturns. Such temporary economic
experiences may be reasons for policy-makers to exercise some pru-
dence in carrying out economic and social policies. But where such
temporary economic experiences generate unwarranted hysteria
towards outsiders as a major cause of financial distress, economic
and social (including immigration-related) protectionism, raising
social and economic walls at borders, is likely to be a shortsighted
and counter-productive policy response.
Rational citizens in most states, in tough times or good,
would still agree 23 that persons outside their country of nationality or
habitual residence who are unwilling or unable to return because of a
"well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group pr political
opinion 24 are persons in need of refuge from their home countries.
Most would agree that as part of the international community, we
22 This perspective reflects a somewhat idealized view of sovereignty in relation to
the national citizen, rather than the more nuanced view that arguably better reflects
twenty-first century realities. Today, states and their citizens often share or surrender
some of their sovereign attributes with others through international systems, such as
the EU or treaty regimes. However, in relation to the bargain between the sovereign
and the national citizen, it is the ideal view that the national citizen will hold the
state to.
23 "All agree" in the sense that virtually all states have agreed to and ratified the U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention] and the Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter
1967 Protocol], which Congress implemented by enacting the Refugee Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157-
59, 1253(h), 1521-24 (2006)) (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. §§
101(a), 207, 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 166, 181, 214 (1952)). About 144 states, including
the U. S., all EU Member States, and China, have agreed to the 1967 Protocol, which
makes the Refugee definition universal.
24 See Refugee Convention, supra note 23, art. 1.
2010
U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
have a responsibility 25 to offer such persons asylum, and hospitality,
ensuring their right to reside and work and to be accorded many of
the rights and protections of national citizens. These rights and
responsibilities include basic social benefits, freedom and security, in
our sovereign states, even though they are not, of course, national
citizens.
With the level of agreement on asylum among states, it
would not be too daring to characterize asylum as a "human right,"
perhaps even something that cannot be denied in a civilized society,
jus cogens, a compelling norm of international law. This notion seems
to conflict, if not clash, with the practices of many states but espe-
cially with the foremost responsibilities of a sovereign state to its
citizens, those essential attributes of sovereignty 26 that are also
embedded obligations to citizens -security of the nation and its
citizens, protection of its cultural and national identity, and ensuring
the economic and social well being of all national citizens-under
which the sovereign may if necessary prohibit all entry.
Whether asylum is a human right or merely a compelling
moral obligation, the protection of those who may be subject to per-
secution in their homelands is critical to the humanity of our world
moving forward. It also is an obligation that must be met in the
context of the indefeasible obligations of sovereign states to their
citizens. If these dual obligations are to be successfully met, it is also
critical that they be seen as mutually reinforcing and that they be
fulfilled by current and emerging economic powers, particularly the
European Union and its Member States, the United States, and the
emerging economic giants such as China. This means that states need
25 When states, such as Greece and others, seem to resist effectuating these
responsibilities, one wonders whether all have committed to this responsibility in
fact agree that it is a right, or even a privilege. See Greece: Iraqi Asylum Seekers,
supra note 2.
26 See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812), where Chief
Justice John Marshall stated that "(t)he jurisdiction of the nation, within its own
territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute ..." , as an essential attribute of
sovereignty.; see also Chae Chan Ping v. Unites States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)
(proclaiming the plenary power of the federal government to exclude foreigners);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (extending the plenary
power over foreigners to the power to deport foreigners).
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to create principled and reliable, perhaps even parallel frameworks,
that can be consistently if not uniformly applied to ensure the full
protection of asylees and refugees 27 without eroding the essential
attributes of sovereignty. It is essential for well-developed states to
create a duality of primary rights that, in their implementation, never
reach the point of ultimate conflict and that ensure national and
international security and well-being sufficient to guarantee spaces of
freedom for all national citizens while still welcoming all refugees.
In this article, I will first discuss some underlying funda-
mental concepts, such as borders, national citizenship, and sover-
eignty. I will also discuss the values and principles animating and
defining these concepts, including national identity and how it func-
tions or should function in states that seek to create spaces of
freedom; then I will discuss some key asylum principles and prac-
tices. In the end, I suggest some principles and practices that ought to
both (1) animate the application of asylum principles and practices
and (2) reinforce the essential attributes of sovereignty and national
citizenship 28 in the European Union, the United States, and, in time,
beyond.
27 This article focuses on asylees, those seeking refuge from within the borders or at
the door of the state from whom asylum is sought, whose predicament presents the
more immediate challenge to the interests of a state's citizens. The core of a
principled framework for defining asylees and refugees would largely be the same,
as is the definition of a refugee in the Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.
However, refugees by definition remain outside the borders of states to which they
seek entry and do not present the same immediate rights conflict. Refugee
Convention, supra note 23, art. 1.
28 1 often use the phrase "national citizenship" rather than merely "citizenship" here
to distinguish the "citizenship" related to sovereignty (connected to the nation-state)
from "European Citizenship", a treaty-based conferral of a number of citizen-like
rights upon national citizens of all Member States, including free movement of
persons to reside, work and do business within all of the states of the European
Union so long as they have sufficient resources, including medical coverage,. See
Case C-413/99, Baumbast & R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dept., 2002 E.C.R. I-
7136, para. 65 (casting European citizenship as of a fundamental nature), http:/
curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (enter case number "C-413/99"; then follow "Search"
hyperlink; then follow the second hyperlink titled "C-413/99"). Though not
discussed here, the premise of this article, cast in terms of the fundamental nature of
2010
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II. BORDERS AND CITIZENS
My starting point on the significance of borders and bound-
aries to people within them and outside them, is Hannah Arendt 29
and how she perceived borders and boundaries as "spaces of
freedom," 30 and protected communities as "islands in a . . . sea or
oases in a desert."31 Arendt declares:
Freedom, where it existed as a tangible reality, has al-
ways been spatially limited. This is especially clear for
the greatest and most elementary of all negative liber-
ties, the freedom of movement; the border of national
territory or the walls of the city-state comprehended and
protected a space in which men could move freely ....
What is true for freedom of movement is, to a large
extent valid for freedom in general. Freedom in a posi-
tive sense is possible only among equals, and equality
itself is by no means a universally valid principle, but
again, applicable only with limitations and even within
spatial limits32
Though her notion that "equality itself is by no means a universally
valid principle" applicable only within spatial limits, would today
have its vigorous challengers, 33 Arendt's view of the essential
national citizenship, strongly implies that European citizenship is not of the same
nature.
29 See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 286 (Harcourt
Brace 1951); see also HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 275 (Penguin Books
1990).
30 See Francis J. Conte, Sink or Swim Together: Citizenship, Sovereignty, and Free
Movement in the European Union and the United States, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 331,
377 (2007).
31 Hans Lindahl, Finding a Place for Freedom, Security and Justice: the European
Union's Claim to Territorial Unity, EUR. L. REV. 461, 463 (2004) (quoting HANNAH
ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 275 (Penguin Books 1990)).
32 Id. at 462 (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 275 (Penguin Books 1990)).
33 See DAVID WEISSBRODT, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS 5 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2005).
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freedom and security protectiveness of borders remains enormously
significant.34
"All communities face boundaries in one form or
another..."35 whether it is the sea surrounding an island community,
mountains that separate cultures of desert and coast, or simply the
territorial borders of a nation-state. If people have no boundaries,
they face fear. Even the Pilgrims who arrived in Massachusetts rather
than their expected destination, Virginia, felt this in drawing up their
"Mayflower Compact." 36 "[T]hey obviously feared the so-called state
of nature, the untrod wilderness, unlimited by any boundary, as well as
the unlimited initiative of men bound by no law." 37 But, within
boundaries, communities may and will flourish in, as Hannah Arendt
would put it, 'spaces of freedom'.38
where the author asserts that international human rights law requires the equal
treatment of citizens and non-citizens (emphasis added). There are instances,
Weissbrodt admits, where non-citizens' expectations of equal treatment are fewer,
such as the improper entry into a country. Id. at 5 n.34. Though not all would
concede his general point, even if equality rights of non-citizens were required by
binding international human rights law, their effective enforcement by either
international or nation-state systems would be sporadic at best, and very limited.
Equal treatment of non-citizens may be best exemplified under U.S. constitutional
law where discrimination by states against permanent resident non-citizens in
employment presumptively violates the Equal Protection Clause, unless the job
constitutes a "public function". See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
34 See THOMAS BLOM HANSEN & FINN STEPPUTAT, SOVEREIGN BODIES: CITIZENS,
MIGRANTS AND STATES IN THE POST COLONIAL WORLD 3 (2005) (focusing on empire
building, the changing nature of our global society, and on the brutality and menace
of the exercise of sovereign power). For a more nuanced, and perhaps more realistic,
view of the roles of sovereignty, citizenship, and borders, see JOHN AGNEW,
GLOBALIZATION & SOVEREIGNTY 60-68 (2009).
35 Conte, supra note 30, at 376.
36 HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 166 (Viking Press 1965) (emphasis added).
37 id.
38 See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951). There
is of course great irony here; Hannah Arendt lived through the most despicable
example of the treatment of peoples within what should have been 'spaces of
freedom.' The inhumane treatment and murder of the Jews by Germans and national
collaborators in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, France and elsewhere is just
the kind of menacing brutality that would lead us to look away from sovereign
power for protection of people. Sovereign power can clearly be profoundly abused.
Hannah Arendt knew this well and studied and rigorously analyzed the causes of the
2010
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In the modern nation-state, of course, these communities are
populated by citizens, national citizens, who are, or should be, bound
to each other, in equality, as members of the national community.
This membership in the political community of the nation-state,39 the
sovereign people of the nation,40 embraces the political and public
dimensions of membership - political participation and engagement,
such as voting, electoral candidacy and service, public service and
policy-making, law-making, interpretation and enforcement; but it is
more than this.
Communities, as 'spaces of freedom,' embody security
dimensions, including physical security, bringing military and other
security activities within the realm of citizenship involvement, per-
haps exclusively. They also require and embrace social security or
social well-being, including health and safety, economic security,
cultural security and environmental security, as well as personal
freedoms, rights and equality.
In these boundaried spaces of freedom there must also be
protection of national identity, which is the quality of the collective
character of people of the nation, its history, law, language and
traditions, and its underlying values of self-identification. This is
what makes the French, French, the Chinese, Chinese, and the Ameri-
can, American. This means that the sovereign must protect its national
citizens as a whole, including the foundations of their values of self-
identification, from reasonably perceived threats to them, so that they
may flourish within their spaces of freedom. The continuing
significance of this role and relationship between sovereign and
citizen, is not always recognized, perhaps understandably, by
abuse. See generally Id. In aftermath of that debasement of elemental human values,
fortunately its witnesses and survivors led the world to the Refugee Convention and
the development of a growing regime of human rights, which will hopefully curb
this kind of "nationalist" bloodthirstiness. Although of course, considering the
genocides of Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur, among others, we have not
learned well enough.
39 See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 7; Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 454 (2000); see also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES
OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 32 (1983); Conte, suipra note
30, at 385.
40 MARTIN ET AL., suipra note 7.
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scholars 41 or even by supra-national institutions, such as the
European Court of Justice.42 But it exists, vibrantly and prominently,
today.
Sovereignty animated security protections, essential to
national citizens, often advance the development of (1) social insti-
tutions, including rights to residence and employment, education,
health and safety, family, home, personal well-being and autonomy,
security for the elderly, children and the vulnerable; (2) economic
institutions, including individual and corporate business, banking
and finance, and the professions and trades, food and agriculture,
work and earnings systems; (3) cultural elements, such as language,
arts, history, religion, diversity, lifestyle and deeply rooted traditions;
(4) environmental characteristics, such as physical space, water, air,
energy, land use, forests, parks and nature; as well as (5) self-
governing political and legal institutions and all of the rights, benefits
and privileges that they confer and are responsible for. In addition to
the essentialness of protecting these security dimensions of
citizenship in the sovereign state, it must also be ensured that the
national identity of citizens43 is not threatened. Rational policies
protecting the vitality and long-term health of national identity
should be expected, and able to be relied upon.
National citizens have almost always been happy to share
much of the protection within the spaces of freedom offered by
sovereign boundaries, with invited and otherwise welcome non-
citizens, even to some significant extent with unwelcome non-citi-
zens. Concerns about sharing the benefits of the sovereign arise when
such sharing would encumber or threaten sovereignty's protections.
41 See, e.g., Fuglerud, supra note 21.
42 See Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't., 2002
E.C.R. 1-7091, para. 93 (holding that a national requirement that non-nationals carry
insurance for medical emergencies in the Member State of residence could not
destroy the right of residence of EU citizens, and embracing the fundamental
character of freedoms under European citizenship, purporting to leave little, or much
less room for Member States to fully protect the well-being of their own national
citizens), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (enter case number "C-413/99"; then
follow the "Search" hyperlink; then follow the second hyperlink titled "C-413/99").
43 See infra text accompanying notes 46-62.
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Reliable assurances of the sovereign's protection of critical levels 44 of
well-being in each space or enclave of freedom are essential to the on-
going vitality of the national community, today's sovereign nation-
state of citizens.
Spaces of freedom also need to include a felicitous environ-
ment for the enjoyment of basic fundamental rights and freedoms,
perhaps beginning with the freedom of unfettered movement and the
right to reside anywhere in the nation-state. Spaces of freedom
should also include the freedoms of expression, assembly, press, reli-
gion, privacy and individual autonomy, access to justice and due
process, the right to vote, the right to travel, including the right to
leave the state, and equality before the law. Such citizenship-based
rights protect the humanity of everyone, certainly those within the
nation-state, but also very much those outside it. In Hannah Arendt's
vision it was in non-citizenship that those oppressed, dispossessed,
imprisoned or enslaved and ultimately murdered in World War II,
became "rightless" because they were not part of, not within, the
community of citizens. 45 Moreover, in the states where non-citizen
Jews or Romas lived, they shared few, and eventually, none of the
benefits of their spaces of freedom, defining citizenship rigidly and
racially and seeing an obligation, not for hospitality, but for
untempered hostility.
As pointed out above, the day-to-day reality of who most
people see themselves as, their national identity, is of fundamental
44 What the minimum or critical level of protection is, may be the subject for another
discussion. For now, it is enough to say that the level of protection required should
be that level that is sufficient to enable the maintenance of adequate national
resources for each element of the "space for freedom," reasonable growth and
adequate health of social, economic and other institutions advancing the vitality of
other elements of the nation's well-being, and a healthy environment for the
unstrained protection of rights, freedom and equality. What may be 'much more than
necessary' or disproportionate protection, and how non-citizens can be protected
against it, is an important and interesting question. In the European Union context of
course, this question would often be addressed by the European Court of Justice, in
determining the rights of "European Citizens" who have moved to and are residing a
Member State of which they are not national citizens. See generally Bauimbast, 2002
E.C.R. 1-7091.
45 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 293-95 (1951).
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importance, individually and collectively. This self-identification
might have a psychological dimension.46 It concerns a combination of
an individual's self-identification of herself and a people's collective
experience of itself, what has been called "the affective ties of identi-
fication and solidarity" with other people around us, sometimes even
with people in other parts of the world who share this collective
experience. 47 When I visit Ireland from which some of my descend-
ants left over 150 years ago, I am effusively greeted with "welcome
home." In some cases this reflects family connection. However it is
just as often a greeting from strangers; the family connection is to the
'national family.' This is reinforced by long-held views, still
generations later, that those who left 150 years ago were coerced
economic exiles, temporarily exiled by famine and the policies of
Ireland's colonial oppressor, intending someday to return. The
Norwegian government, which has recently expressed concern over
encroachment upon Norway's national identity by many groups,
currently welcomes back Norwegian Russians, the descendants of
Norwegian fishermen and their families who had migrated in the
18th century with their families to fish along the Kola Peninsula on
Russian soil and remained there through the 1917 Revolution and
Soviet life,48 despite being "... treated as traitors under the communist
regime." 49 "[FIrom one of the poorest places ... in Europe ..." they are
welcomed back to the "fatherland" to live in one of the richest
countries, Norway, "[due to] their genes [!]"50 National identity
remains, well beyond sojourns abroad, overriding, perhaps more
than it should be, but national identity alas. Even today we are
children and descendants of Norwegian and Irish, deemed still to
share the same national identity.
This notion is recognized in Ireland by the ease with which
the children of grandparents born in Ireland may acquire Irish
citizenship without themselves or their parents ever having lived in
46 Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447,
479 (2000).
47 id.
48 Fugelrud, sipra note 21, at 305, 306.
49 1d. at 306.
50 Id.
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Ireland. Other national groups share this fervid national identity
solidarity, for example, the French in Quebec, Poles in Chicago,
Chinese everywhere.
In any case, this self-identification and collective experience
of the people of the nation lies at the heart of national citizenship, and
engenders solidarity, passionate loyalty and family connectedness. It
may have been this national identity for example, as much or more
than economic or social well-being, that led the French and the Dutch
in 2005 to reject ratification of the proposed Constitutional Treaty of
the European Union.51 It was somewhat ironic that the French people,
through their national leaders, have been leading voices in support
of, and great beneficiaries of the European Community and the
European Union from its inception. The French language is the
primary language of work in the EU's institutions, the one language
really required of all officials and staff. In addition, the European
Parliament's headquarters is in Strasbourg in deference to France's
cornerstone role in the development of the EU. French agriculture has
historically greatly benefitted economically from special treatment
and subsidies in the EU, and the French people have greatly bene-
fitted from the security virtually guaranteed by the EU's creation of
interdependence with German industry and power. Somewhat ironic
indeed, it was Valery Giscard d'Estaing, former president of France,
who chaired, drove and controlled the Convention for the Future of
Europe, which produced the proposed Constitutional Treaty. It was
51 In 2005, French and Dutch citizens voted against the European Union's proposed
Constitutional Treaty. Fear was expressed, in France for example, of the likely
disproportionate influx of "Polish Plumbers", a fairly obvious surrogate for concerns
about dilution of French identity in France. Coupled with recent immigration and
migration from North Africa and concerns about EU expansion to Eastern Europe
and potentially Turkey, this further exacerbated the national identity dilution
concerns of many French people. In the Netherlands, concerns about expansion and
integration of different cultures, particularly Muslim cultures, triggered by the
murders of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh and anti-immigration populist Pym Fortun by
radical Islamists, likely led to feelings of vulnerability for the Dutch cultural and
national identity. The proposed Constitutional Treaty , though not itself particularly
significant in relation to expansion of, and migration to Member States of the EU,
was a surrogate for perceived external threats to national control over one's own
national and cultural identity.
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ironic as well for the Dutch, long seen as the most tolerant of
societies, liberal and generous of peoples and ideas, welcoming in the
broadest sense.
When push came to shove the Dutch voted against the Consti-
tutional Treaty, and for national identity. Contributing factors
included 52 Muslim migration and immigration to the Netherlands,
about 1 million mostly of Moroccan and Turkish origin, coupled with
concerns about radical Islamic political behavior, including the
assassination of Theo Van Gogh.53 More recently, rigid adherence to
non-Dutch traditions and values, and street crime by young Muslims,
has led to a call by the most liberal of Dutch political parties in a
White Paper 54 for Muslims, who live in or want to live in the
Netherlands, to become Dutch, to acquire the Dutch language, to
know, understand and embrace Dutch culture, history and traditions,
and to know, understand and live by Dutch political, social and
cultural values.
In the Dutch Labor Party's view, the Dutch should offer space
to traditions and religions of new people living in the Netherlands,
but there cannot be parallel societies. Immigrants should find
emancipation in becoming Dutch, "take responsibility for this
country and 'cherish and protect its Dutch essence'." 55 While other
traditions may be welcome, the enormous importance of national
identity cannot be submerged by other cultural, even religious,
52 See supra, notes 12, 15, and 51. The assassinations of Van Gogh and Fortun by
radical Islamists bred in the Netherlands, the threats to a member of Parliament,
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the Somali woman critic of radical Islam, and the way of life of
many Muslims, deliberately lived in cultural and religious ghettoes, apart from, and
disdaining Dutch values, and the rise of support for radical Islamic terrorism within
the Muslim community, together are perceived to represent a threat to Dutch
national and cultural identity. See generally Vinocur, supra, note 12.
53 See Theodore Dalyrymple, Why Theo van Gogh Was Murdered, CITY JOURNAL,
Nov. 11, 2004, http://city-journal.org/printable.php?id-1719 and Van Gogh Killer
Jailed for Life, BBC NEWS, Jul. 26, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
4716909.stm.
54 See Vinocur, supra, note 12 (reporting on the call from Lilianne Ploumen, leader
of the Dutch Labor Party, for an end to "the failed model of Dutch 'tolerance."').
55 Id. (quoting Ploumen as she advances the very positive, freedom enhancing
aspects of integration and becoming Dutch).
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traditions and identification, at least when it comes to national
citizenship, perhaps even "residence."
The protection of national culture by the sovereign nation-
state is an essential dimension of national citizenship. The health of a
nation, and its strength, is derived from the vitality of the national
culture. Conflict becomes less disruptive, cohesion embraces tran-
quility and contributes to a general feeling of security in the
community. At some point immigrants may challenge this cohesion,
particularly those who resist integration or who significantly reduce
the availability of adequate resources for the national community;
then they become unabsorbable by the fabric of social and cultural
well-being. 56
Before World War II, Poland was a diverse multi-cultural
nation. Polish speaking persons of Polish origin, almost always
Roman Catholic, made up about 69% of the nation's people in the
years of the Second Polish Republic, between 1921 and 1939. Jews,
Romas, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Germans, many
of whom spoke predominantly their own language and adhered
closely to their own religions and cultural traditions, made up the
remaining 31 % of the population. Poland and surrounding states
were reconfigured in the aftermath of World War II by Josef Stalin
other Allied leaders. Over a third of the former Poland, parts of
Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania would become parts of the Soviet
Union. Parts of the former Germany, regions known as Silesia,
Pomerania and east Prussia became part of Poland, to which over a
million Poles from the eastern portions of its former state were
resettled, the Germans being forcibly relocated back to the new,
smaller Germany. More tragically, over 3 million Polish Jews had
been gruesomely murdered and over 3 million other Poles, Roma and
others were also murdered by the Germans during World War II. The
consequences of World War II and the aftermath of Communist Party
rule for over 40 years led to a new and very different Poland. Its land
mass was reduced by 20% and its population about 35 million in
1929. By 1945, the population had reduced to 23 million, over a third
of the former population. The Poland that emerged from World War
56 See WEISSBRODT, supra note 33.
V. is
Spaces of Freedom for Citizens and Asylees
II and the Poland of today is a nation of over 98% Polish speaking,
ethnically Polish, largely Roman Catholic Poles in Poland, a Poland
with virtually no Jews or Romas, Lithuanians or Ukrainians. 57
Today, when asked, some thoughtful Poles strongly believe
that the ethnically "Polish" nation as a functional state is better off
than it had been prior to the war.58 This is not by any means to
suggest that, in their view, the horrific and murderous brutality of
the Germans in Poland in World War II, especially towards the Jews,
justified any of these consequences. Certainly in the period before
World War II, disharmony of values in the newly independent and
democratic Polish political system, included significant anti-
semitism. 59 A major movement, Endecja, and a major political party,
the National Democracy Party led by one of the two major Polish
leaders, Roman Dmowski, openly advocated for anti-Semitic
policies.60 Poles were unable to find sufficient agreement among
political parties. Parties were rife with ethnically connected interests
and coalitions of working political majorities constantly disinte-
grated, leading to quasi-dictatorial rule of the aging Polish revolu-
tionary hero, Marshall Josef Pilsudski and his followers. After
Pilsudski's death in 1935 and then World War 11,61 Poland and the
57 Fulbright Conf. on Polish Culture and Demographics, Univ. of Wroclaw,
Wroclaw, Pol., Sept. 20-30, 2008.
58 This was evident from conversations with Polish academics and other Poles,
usually Poles who were international and liberal in outlook, during the author's year
of teaching in Warsaw, Poland under a Fulbright award in 2008-2009.
59 See EVA HOFFMAN, SCHTETL: THE HISTORY OF A SMALL TOWN AND AN
EXTINGUISHED WORLD, 168-170 (1999) [hereinafter HOFFMAN, SCHTETL].60 Id. at 164-169.
61 The 1939 invasion of Poland, independent from 1918 to 1939, the explosive
trigger for World War 11, was under the pretext of a German claim to German
territory made part of Poland by the allied winners of World War 1. Germans under
Hitler and the Soviets under Stalin laid claim to significant parts of Poland.
Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian national territorial claims undergirded the
Soviet claims. Dating back at least to 1762, much of historical Poland was part of
Russia, and by 1795 Poland no longer existed as Poland, having been partitioned
among the Russian, Prussian and Austro-Hungarian empires. Polish values were
under siege for much of this time, as they would again under post-war Communist
Party rule
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vulnerable Poles would become again victims of oppression and loss
of independence, perhaps a nation of too many nationalities, or one
in search of a national identity.
Some might view the "Polish" view of national identity that
emerged after World War II as a limiting, narrow vision of national
identity and citizenship. In "limiting the circle of persons" upon
whom to ascribe the benefits of citizenship, the glass half empty shall
remain half empty. Of course, these demographic circumstances were
not chosen by the Polish people or any of its governments, but were
forced upon them. It is what Poland has been left with. And indeed,
this limiting or constricted view of Polishness likely contributed to an
exodus of Jews from Poland in the 1950's. Jews who had remained or
returned to Poland after the war, but who after some time, doubting
the ability of the minority culture to thrive, felt the need to look
elsewhere, "such as Israel or North America." 62
Critics would perhaps see citizenship in Poland merely as a
"tie that binds people to [a] government," one for insiders versus
outsiders, 63 and not worth much in the larger moral sense. Thus, for
some it is an excuse for enforcing ethnic purity, for justifying racism,
and a status that can be used to oppress others, a Nazi-like dogma
after all. No doubt this kind of 'blood-purity' "citizenship" can be
used, as it has been, in conjunction with gruesome notions of ethnic
or racial purity and justifying genocide. One must very carefully
scrutinize any signs of this in any society, particularly one seeking to
be excessively protective of its citizens, and uninclusive in its
definition of citizenship, perhaps on racial, religious or ethnic
grounds.
Some see that the concepts of sovereignty and citizenship
together arbitrarily "compartmentalize the planet," enabling
in the grip of Soviet hegemony. See Adam Zamoyski, THE POLISH WAY: A
THOUSAND YEAR HISTORY OF THE POLES AND THEIR CULTURE, 344 55 (Hippocrene
Books 1994).
62 See generally EVA HOFFMAN, LOST IN TRANSLATION (1998) (describing the
experiences of the author and her family in post-war Poland and their move to North
America).
63 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 53 (1975).
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marginalization and discrimination against others 64 who are unable
to share in the elite citizenships. Others see citizenship as a malleable
concept, the effect of a political contest, simply delineating political
membership and the nature of the political community. 65 This is
especially congenial to exponents of a European political state.
National citizenship being malleable, indeed seen as divisible, and
limited in scope, can be seen as evolving into a supranational
citizenship with national citizenship on the way to being replaced by
European citizenship 66 Still others take it a step further, seeing
citizenship as de-linked from the nation-state, that supranational
citizenship, as in the EU for European citizens.67 For some, several
factors have undermined the essentialness of the link of citizenship to
the sovereign nation-state. These factors include: the globalization of
economics and the multiplicity of political relationships, the broadly
binding international human rights regime, parallel rights develop-
ment for resident aliens in some states, and the growing use of
multiple citizenships. The argument is that the sovereign nation-state
is an outmoded concept, and that the exclusivity of national
citizenship should not long endure. 68 But the premises for this
observation are substantially overstated.69
None of these developments are at all inconsistent with a
robust form of national citizenship deeply rooted in the sovereign
nation-state. In fact, much of these developments were created by
nation-states and groups of nation-states deliberately, not to under-
mine the concept of national citizenship but to enrich it. For it is the
healthiest and most secure of national communities that shares its
space, rights and freedom, that in recognizing international human
rights regimes, sees them as non-threatening but life-giving, and that
64 See LAWRENCE T. FARLEY, PLEBISCITES AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE CRISIS OF
POLITICAL ILLEGITIMACY 6-20 (1986); see also Conte, supra note 30.
65 WILLEM MAAS, CREATING EUROPEAN CITIZENS 115-20 (2007).
66 id.
67 Bosniak, supra note 39, at 455 (citing URSULA VOGEL & MICHAEL MORAN, THE
FRONTIERS OF CITIZENSHIP at x-xii (1991)).
68 id.
69 id.
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is free to join with others to attain economic and social goals for its
own national citizens as well as others.
This is also not to say that "political membership" and
"political self-definition" are not significant dimensions of national
citizenship in the sovereign nation state. As Justice Byron White
stated for the U.S. Supreme Court regarding its view of national
citizenship in relation to the exclusion of non-citizens from basic
governmental processes in the state, it is "a necessary consequence of
the community's process of political self-definition. Self-government,
whether direct or through representatives begins by defining the
scope of the community of the governed and thus of the government
as well. Aliens are by definition outside of this community."7 °
However, this definition is only part of the concept of citizen-
ship. National citizenship, with the sovereign nation-state created to
protect it, embraces much more, as reflected above. Citizenship in a
healthy state is also about hospitality, freedom, and rights. Courts
and commentators need to consider this when construing the
"rights" of non-citizens, especially rights concerning migration, resi-
dence and immigration. For although a sovereign state may not be
defined politically by aliens, it cannot thrive without welcoming
hospitality. Sovereign spaces that seek to be the gardens of an
inhospitable citizenry will wither and die.
Once feeling secure and healthy, national citizens and their
governments are far more apt, due to the broad boundary-based
security and protections afforded them by the healthy sovereign
nation-state, to extend the security, rights, privileges, and benefits of
citizens to non-citizens, including uninvited asylees. Indeed, it is in
the robustness and richness of the citizens' well-being, their comfort
in their national identity, in their freedom, rights, and political
control of their nation-states, that those seeking asylum will
ultimately be best protected. It is the most free and secure who can
and will offer the best hospitality to the least free and secure.
70 Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 437-440 (1982) (holding that a state could
require that Deputy Probation Officers be American citizens because the position
involves public policy execution, which substantially affects members of the
political community).
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III. HOSPITALITY
"Wariness towards 'strangers' predates any formal system for
granting or denying citizenship." 71 The ancient Greeks limited
citizenship to a few; others were deemed to be "barbarians." 72 But,
despite this crabbed view of citizenship, and fearsome view of
foreigners, "hospitality towards foreigners was generally practiced
by ancient peoples." 73 Even in primitive society:
[T]o deny shelter to a stranger and abandon him to
himself would have been more than a simple lack of
courtesy; it would have been an act of positive cruelty.
For, there being no support from any public institutions,
life in a foreign country without the benefit of private
hospitality would have been well nigh impossible. 74
The "ancients" sympathized with foreigners, even in cultural
environments where citizens deemed them to be non-persons.75
Later, in medieval times and in the Middle Ages, notions of
the equality of all persons and the inherent dignity of the individual
were affirmed in Christian Church doctrine espoused by St.
Augustine.76 Still, the hospitality respecting equality and the inherent
dignity of the individual at that time may have meant no more than
71 WEISSBRODT, supra note 33, at 18 (citing RICHARD B. LILLICH, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (Gillian M. White ed.,
1984)).
72 Id. at 18-19 (citing I COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 145 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2001)
(1911); James A. R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens under International
Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804, 809 (1983)).
73 Id. at 19 (citing Giorgio Del Vecchio, The Evolution of Hospitality: A Note on the
History of the Treatment of Foreigners, 4 SYDNEY L. REV. 205, 205 (1962-64)).
74 Giorgio Del Vecchio, The Evolution of Hospitality: A Note on the History of the
Treatment of Foreigners, 4 SYDNEY L. REV. 205, 207 (1962-64).
75 WEISSBRODT, supra note 33, at 20.76 [d. at 21-22.
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access to safety, shelter, and food, bargained and paid for; and for
merchants, the right to trade, and pass through the country.77
When Christopher Columbus was "discovering" the Ameri-
cas, 78 he encountered numerous groups of native people, including
Mayans near the Yucatan peninsula, Guaymi in the area of coastal
Panama, and others on the islands and continental coasts. These
people often offered Columbus and the Spaniards food and gifts,
including gold, shelter, safe passage in their lands and waters, and
the opportunity to trade; in another word, "hospitality."79 However,
when they learned of the Spaniards' efforts to take possession of their
lands, build a permanent settlement or colony, intrude upon their
way of life and well-being, and threaten their security, the natives
turned to warfare and in the beginning sometimes drove the
Spaniards away.80
Concerns about the motives and threats of new arrivals,
foreigners, non-citizens, and their different cultural traditions,
religions, values, appearances, and national identity, continue to play
a substantial role in forming the views of citizens towards non-
citizens, and ultimately the development of national public policy
towards migrants and immigrants. However, increasing knowledge,
education, international agreements, and global awareness can
mediate to help create an expectation, and eventually a desire, to
offer more humane, hospitable, and rights-driven national policies.
When encountering persons and families from different cultures and
ethnic identities, society cannot turn away from the visible and less
visible private, often painful, challenges they are encountering in a
new land. Immigrants, even those lawfully living and supported in
the new land, often face enormous difficulties adjusting to the
17 See id. at 22-23.
78 Other Europeans, Irish, Vikings and perhaps others had discovered what
would become the American continent before Columbus, but he stayed, or
wanted to, establishing settlements and beginning the process of colonization.
See MARTIN DUGARD, THE LAST VOYAGE OF COLUMBUS 267 (2005).
79 Id. at 60-61, 150-54, 184-87. Although arguably this initial hospitality may have
been offered in part out of fear, done to placate the Spaniards, it was also clearly
offered in recognition of the Spaniards' vulnerability.
801d. at 61, 186-204.
Spaces of Freedom for Citizens and Asylees
culture, language, and social constructs of the host society. Families
and individuals often still cling to bedrock elements of life in the
homelands that they have physically abandoned. It sometimes seems
that they have given up paradise for sterile exile.8 They are often
mourning the loss of their home country and their family
foundation.8 2
Hospitality towards non-citizens today takes, and must take,
many forms beyond access to food, shelter, and safety. Today lawful
resident non-citizens in the United States are often treated "equal
under the law," often including having equal access to employment
opportunities, 3 equal educational opportunities, equal access to
health and social benefits (such as housing and food), protection by
81 Though the remaining Polish Jews of the Poland of the 1950s saw little chance for
success in a land where their numbers were one-tenth what they had been, when they
left, many felt lost in a new world in which their language, culture, and ways had
little value. See HOFFMAN, SCHTETL, supra note 59.
82 See generally ROSANNE BIOCCHI & SHANTHI RADCLIFFE, A SHARED EXPERIENCE:
BRIDGING CULTURES: RESOURCES FOR CROSS-CULTURAL TRAINING (1983).
83 See Sugarman v. Dougal, 413 U.S. 634 (1975); In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973) (confirming that state laws discriminating against non-citizens in
employment as well as in the distribution of social benefits will be subject to strict
scrutiny and holding that states could not prevent otherwise qualified non-citizens
from obtaining civil service jobs or practicing law). Similar rules apply in the EU, at
least with respect to "European" non-nationals; a state cannot deny employment in
the private sector, and in much of the public sector, to non-national citizens from
other Member States. See Case 149/79, Comm'n v. Belgium, 1980 E.C.R. 3881. On
the other hand where the job entails activities that go to the heart of the public
political system, such as making public policy or enforcing the law, in the U.S., the
Court's scrutiny will not be so strict. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S 291 (1978);
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding state laws limiting employment
of state police officers and public school teachers to citizens, or in the latter case to
those intending to become citizens, under the "public function exception"). In the
EU, there is also an exception to the rule against non-citizen discrimination where
"public service" employment occupies a "special relationship of allegiance to the
state." Belgium, E.C.R. at 3882. However, the exception appears to be a bit
narrower than that of the U.S.; for example, non-citizens cannot be prohibited from
teaching in public secondary schools. See Case C-4/91, Bleis v. Ministere de
l'Education Nationale, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5627.
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law enforcement, and access to the justice system and fair judicial
procedures. 84
Hospitality towards non-citizens unlawfully residing in a state
has not been as expansive. They usually receive fewer benefits of
hospitality; they might not receive access to free or discounted higher
public education, 85 social benefits, or employment. However, In the
United States and some other nation-states unlawfully residing non-
citizens are still constitutionally protected as persons, less so than
lawful non-citizen residents, but they do often receive the safeguards
of due process of the law, equal protection of the law, and other
fundamental rights, if not the right to remain in the country.86
As will be discussed further below, hospitality to non-citizens
should also include reasonable, clear, just, and consistently applied
standards by states in making "asylum" determinations, and full,
fair, consistent, and competently administered procedures. In time,
hospitality should also include the development of policies that will
enable persons deserving refuge due to humanitarian reasons other
than asylum, to remain and reside in the host nation-state under the
same conditions as qualified asylees. Collateral to this recognition it
would make sense that such hospitality based policies also include
affirmative efforts to ensure safe and healthy temporary shelter and
food, to reunify and keep families together, and to assist in locating
and coordinating efforts to relocate and resettle people not qualifying
as asylees. Such hospitality should also ensure, to the extent com-
patible with the security of the community of citizens, the
enforcement of the full panoply of individual rights available to
citizens in the state, subject to appropriate limitations determined to
84 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (confirming that the courts and the
constitutional protections of the 14th Amendment were available to non-citizens);
see also Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971) (excluding non-citizens from welfare benefits violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment).
15 But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that the State of Texas
could not deny a public school education to the children of undocumented
aliens).86
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be inconsistent with non-citizen status. Should guests not be as free
and comfortable as their hosts? Is that not what hospitality means?
IV. ASYLUM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
In the European Union (EU), legislators and commentators
speak of "a common European asylum system,"87 and an EU-wide
commitment to the standards for asylum eligibility elaborated and
agreed to in the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
and its 1967 Protocol.88
The EU has enacted measures that establish "minimum
standards on procedures in Member States (of the EU) for granting
and withdrawing refugee status."89 These constitute an extensive set
of procedural standards, procedural due process-like safeguards on
applications for asylum, including minimum standards on "criteria
and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible
for examining the asylum application lodged in one of the Member
States by a third-country national ..... 90 This is intended as a road
map for Member States to determine which Member State is
responsible9l for examining and acting upon a claimant's application
87 Battjes, supra note 3.
88 See Refugee Convention, supra note 23; 1967 Protocol, supra note 23; see also
Council Directive 2004/83, on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status
of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons who
Otherwise need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted,
2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EC).
89 Council Directive 2005/85, art. 1, 2005 O.J. (L 326) 13, 16 (EC).90 Council Regulation No. 343/2003, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1, 2 (EC) (replacing the
Dublin Convention whose implementation stimulated the process of harmonizing
asylum policies).
91 Often persons seeking asylum will first enter the EU in one Member State, either
as a temporary visitor or undetected, and then once in the EU move on to one or
more other Member States, perhaps to reunite with family or friends, or to find work
or support in another Member State. Passing from one to another Member State in
much of the EU goes unnoticed and unmonitored to facilitate freedom of movement
within the EU. So, once passing through an external EU border from outside the EU,
the asylee claimant, or potential asylee claimant can rather readily move among
Member States. The claimant may then seek to claim asylum in a Member State
other than the first one he or she has entered.
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for asylum, once a claim for asylum is being made.92 EU law also
requires all Member States to apply at least minimum standards for
the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless
persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international
protection.93 These standards make reference to the common Euro-
pean asylum system and policies, and require that Member States
evaluate claims in accordance with a number of relevant content-
based elements (factors) to be taken into account in determining
whether the applicant has a "well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality membership in a particular
social group or political opinion." 94 Even with all these efforts to
achieve fairness, hospitality, clarity, and consistency throughout the
EU, enormous differences in the application of these procedural
criteria and substantive standards remain.
In some recent years only one-twentieth of one percent of
those seeking asylum in Greece were awarded asylum. 95 At the same
time, presumably subject to the same criteria and standards, Sweden
recognized asylum in forty to fifty percent or more of cases brought.96
In addition, "Greece denies protection to vulnerable people and
abuses them in detention."97 Critically, also, there is no mention in
the controlling EU Qualification Directive of the core meaning of
92 Council Regulation No. 343/2003, art. 3, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1, 3 (EC). These
criteria, which usually point to the responsibility of the first EU Member State
entered, under Article 3 also permit the Member State to which the claimant applies
to examine the application for asylum even if that Member State is not otherwise
"responsible" for examining the application.
93 Council Directive 2004/83, art. 1, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12, 14 (EC).
94 Id. at arts. 2, 4, 5, 9, & 10. A number of these interpretive elements appear to be
drawn from U.S. asylum cases. For example, Article 10(d) of the Directive states
that "a group shall be considered to form a particular social group where in particular
members of that social group share an innate characteristic, or a common
background that cannot be changed or share a characteristic or belief that is so
fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce
it, .... " although according to the Directive, this definition does not apply to "sexual
orientation" when such a status does not include "acts" considered to be criminal in
the relevant law of the Member State.
95 Greece: Iraqi Asylum Seekers, supra note 2.
96 Battjes, supra note 3.
97 Greece: Iraqi Asylum Seekers, supra note 2.
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"well-founded fear of persecution," particularly with respect to the
level of risk of persecution that needs to be demonstrated by the
claimant, or of the meaning of the term "persecution." There are no
references to burdens of proof, no mention of the need or lack thereof
for collaborative documentary evidence, nor of the value that should
be attributed to certain other forms of evidence by the decision-
maker, such as personal testimony and reports of governmental and
non-governmental organizations.98
There is no indication of just what kinds of circumstances
constitute a qualifying well-founded fear of persecution, and what level
of risk, or what probability or possibility that "persecution" would
occur. The European Court of Justice makes reference to the
"probability" that the claimant herself would actually suffer persecu-
tion.99 There is little attention given to the important idea that fear,
even a well-founded fear, is a subjective construct. European courts
seem to be taken with the need to prove some level of individual threat
of persecution, being caught up in connecting the claimant personally
to likely persecution, rather than the notion that those who belong to
a qualifying group of persons who are being persecuted may well
have a well-founded fear of persecution.10 0 This is, of course, just one
element of the asylum or refugee standards that adjudicators apply,
though it is a linchpin to the award of asylum. The terms "well
founded fear," level of risk, and burden of proof are linchpin
elements, and need proper and just definitions that are consistently
applied. Definitions of other elements, such as "persecution" and
98 See Refugee Convention, supra note 23; 1967 Protocol, supra note 23; see also
Council Directive 2004/83, on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status
of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons who
Otherwise need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted,
2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EC).
99 See, e.g., In Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08, C-179/08 Abdulla, et al.
v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, para. 85 (March 2, 2010), http://curia.
europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j 6/ (enter case number "C-175/08"; then follow the "Search"
hyperlink; then follow the second hyperlink titled "C-175/08").
'00 See Case of R.C. v. Sweden, App. No. 41827/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) (Fura, J.,
dissenting), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage EN (follow the
"Case-Law" hyperlink; then follow the "HUDOC" icon; then enter "41827/07" in
the "Application Number" search box; then follow the "Search" hyperlink).
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"membership in a particular social group," may also need attention.
In Greece, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) reports that asylum decisions do not include sufficient
reference to the facts or include any detailed legal reasoning, just
standardized references to "economic motivation for leaving the
country of origin," even when claimants are "from countries in
conflict... generat[ing] significant numbers of refugees." 10 1
Without developing just and clear standards on the most
salient aspect of the asylum determination, the "well-founded fear of
persecution" element, and its consistent application throughout the
EU, in each Member State, harmony in the application of EU asylum
standards, much less uniformity, will not be found, and widely
divergent treatment of asylees and others seeking refuge will
continue to rule in the EU.102 Asylum recognition rates in EU Member
States as indicated above will continue to vary wildly.10 3 The
applicants' country of first contact with the EU will also continue to
be a significant and often adverse determinant in the award of
asylum. Again, the Greek example; over the same period, in Greece,
the first EU country of contact for many asylees and where untrained
police officials have been making most initial asylum determinations,
only two percent of Iraqis fleeing war and political and religious
vengeance in Iraq were eventually granted asylum, whereas forty
percent of Iraqis were granted asylum in Belgium. 104
101 See The UN Refugee Agency, Asylum in the European Union: A Study of the
Implementation of the Qualification Directive 31-34 (Nov. 2007), http://www.
unhcr.org/47302b6c2.html.
102 In the author's experience as an advocate and observer, when immigration judges
have an excess of discretion in evaluating whether a "well-founded fear of
persecution" exists and whether the nature of the evidence is sufficient to support
such a well-founded fear, preconceived social and political attitudes as to what is
fitting all too often drive the judges determinations. Clearly articulated burdens and
evidentiary standards tend to lessen the judges control and exercise of personal
predilection, and where serious applicants do not succeed at the first level, offer
greater opportunities for success on appeal. And my experience comes in an
immigrant-receptive country context, unlike most of the European settings.
103 Battjes, supra note 3.
104 id.
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Harmony or uniformity in the application of asylum proce-
dures and legal standards will not alone of course guarantee con-
sistency in the recognition of similarly situated asylum claimants. In
the U.S. where procedures are fairly uniform and substantive stand-
ards and criteria virtually the same throughout the country, asylum
recognition rates among immigration officials and judges often vary
widely in accordance depending upon the locality of the decision-
maker, the national origin of the claimant, and even the gender of the
judge. 10 5 Still, without the assurance that procedures and standards
are being uniformly applied throughout the EU, consistency cannot
be even a distant hope. A step toward bringing substance and
direction to bare labels must be made.
In Recommendations to the Swedish Presidency of the EU for
the latter half of 2009, the United Nations High Commissioner on
Refugees (UNHCR) noted that applications for asylum by persons of
the same nationality with similar case histories were resulting in
totally different outcomes in different EU Member States, thus
"undermining the very premise of a Common European Asylum
System."10 6 The problem is clearly recognized. A big step to a
solution must come next.
It may be difficult for EU policy-makers to foresee all of the
particular interpretive challenges that will emerge from new legis-
lated criteria, and even more difficult to obtain an EU-wide Member
State and legislative agreement on fair, just, clear and complete
interpretive standards, the quest for uniform, clear and much more
precise standards must be made. This quest must be made if the EU
is to successfully address migrant movement into the EU and
develop a rights and hospitality based EU-wide asylum policy. The
resulting predictability and reliability would leave national citizens of
105 See RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., supra note 6, at 17-53. While the disparities in the
U.S. are not as large as those in the EU, they are significant. An asylum claimant is
more than four times more likely to be granted asylum in San Francisco, New York
and Orlando, than in Atlanta; a claimant is twice as likely to be granted asylum in
Chicago or Boston than in Detroit. Id. at 37.
106 See The UN Refugee Agency, Moving Ahead: Ten Years after Tampere
UNCHR's Recommendations to Sweden for its European Union Presidency (July-
Dec. 2009), http://www.unhcr.org/4a3b5ef56.pdf.
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Member States secure in their well-being and national identity, and
which would be fair, just and hospitable to persons seeking refuge in
the EU. In time, the European Court of Justice could supply some
interpretive guidance. However, given the nature of the Court's
process, including the reticence of the courts of a number of Member
States to refer cases to the ECJ, its deference to implementation by
Member State courts of last resort, the timeliness of its process (about
2 years per case, except in accelerated cases, which have been rare),
and the piecemeal and perhaps haphazard approach to addressing a
policy that needs a coherent, purposive solution with all parts work-
ing together, it would be inefficient and perhaps ineffective to ulti-
mately leave it to the ECJ. It would be better to come to terms with
completeness, clarity and consistency through European legislation.
Though there is much to focus upon in the U.S. and EU, and
there are currently procedural directives (legislation) directing the
setting of minimum standards for all asylum applicants,10 7 and
minimum standards for the reasonable and humane treatment of
asylee applicants and their families before, during and after refugee
status determinations,10 8 and laws concerning the harmony and
cooperation among Member States on border arrangements, 109 and
on the criteria for determining which Member State is responsible for
examining asylum applications,110 there are other linchpin elements
that need to be considered. A key to establishing refuge in another
land is having competent and responsible decision-makers apply the
actual legal standard under which one becomes qualified to be a
refugee. As the concerns noted by the UNHCR above indicate,"'
divergent applications of the same general principles leading to
divergent outcomes ill serve an effective, just, and hospitable system.
In order to attain coherent, just and consistently applied asylum
107 See, e.g., Council Directive 2005/85, 2005 O.J. (L 326) 13, 16 (EC)..
108 See, e.g., Council Directive 2003/9, Laying Down Minimum Standards for the
Reception of Asylum Seekers, 2003 O.J. (L 31) 18 (EC).
109 Council Regulation 2007/2004, Establishing a European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member
States of the European Union, 2004 O.J. (L 349) 1 (EC).
''0 Council Regulation No. 343/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1, 2 (EC)3.
111 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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principles and practice, that in turn would lead to a robust rights-
based and hospitable outcome for asylees in foreign lands, these
policies and practices must also be mindful of, indeed reinforce, the
essential attributes of national sovereignty and the values underlying
national citizenship. To that end, much more needs to be done.
V. SALIENT U.S. ASYLUM PRINCIPLES
Several key U.S. asylum principles set the standards for
proving an asylum claim, the most significant of which may be, the
level of risk of persecution, or burden of proof, that a claimant must
demonstrate and meet in order to be considered an asylee or
refugee. 112 In INS v. Stevic the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted Section
243(h), now Section 241(b)(3), of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) which requires the Attorney General to withhold the
deportation of a claimant whose "life or freedom would be
threatened . . . because of the alien's race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."' 13 The
Court required claimants to demonstrate "a clear probability of
persecution," that it is more likely than not that the claimant would
be subject to persecution, a high hurdle to overcome for most
claimants. 114
Over the next several years the government imposed the
same burden of proof upon claimants seeking asylum under Section
208 of the INA, the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard.115
Then in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice Stevens, who had authored the
Stevic opinion, declared that unlike the language of Section
12 See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984) (holding that an alien must establish
a "clear probability of persecution" to avoid deportation under Section 243(h) of
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (holding that asylum applications under
Section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. 1158
(2006), need only show a "well-founded fear of persecution"). In Cardoza-Fonseca,
the Court noted that Congress intended Section 208(a) to conform with the standards
set forth in the 1967 Protocol. 480 U.S. at 434, 436-37.
113 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1996).
114 Stevec, 467 U.S. at 429.
115 See Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211,219 (B.I.A. 1985).
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243(h)116- "whose life or freedom would be threatened" -the
language of Section 208-"a well-founded fear of persecution"-
meant that the asylum determination must turn, to some extent, on
the subjective mental state of the alien and not necessarily on any
substantial likelihood that the claimant herself would be perse-
cuted.117 Justice Stevens went on to point out that the "difference
between the words 'well-founded fear' and 'clear probability' may be
as striking as that between a subjective and an objective frame of
reference . *."..,118 Such a "well-founded fear," he noted, can occur
with less than a fifty percent chance.1 19 In fact, he noted approvingly
the following statement:
Let us ... presume that it is known that in the appli-
cant's country of origin every tenth adult male person is
either put to death or sent to some remote labor camp.
... In such a case it would be only too apparent that
anyone who has managed to escape from the country in
question will have 'well-founded fear of being persecu-
ted' upon his eventual return.120
While the Court did not there "set forth a detailed description
of how the 'well-founded fear' test should be applied," 121 it was clear
that the test would focus on the individual's fear, and that the
"ordinary and obvious meaning of the phrase is not to be lightly
discounted."122
116 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429-30 (1987) (where Justice Stevens
pointed out that the mandatory nature of the obligation on the Attorney General,
under Sec. 243(h), now Sec. 241(b)(3), to withhold deportation and the language
used in the statute that the alien show that his or her life or freedom would be
threatened, supported a higher, objective burden, such as "clear probability of
persecution").
117 Id. at 430-31.118 Id. at 431 (quoting Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1250 (5th Cir. 1986)).
119 Id
120 Id. (quoting I A. GROHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 180 (1966)).
121 Id. at 448.
122 Id. at 431 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198-99 (1976)).
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Close on the heels of Cardoza-Fonseca, the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA) asserted that an asylum claimant under Section
208 must demonstrate "that a reasonable person in [the claimant's]
circumstances would fear persecution."'123 And, in 1996, INA regu-
lations were amended to require decision-makers to grant asylum if
"[t]here is a reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution if he
or she were to return to [the home] country."124 Both of these efforts
to put flesh on the bones of the Court's Cardoza-Fonseca principle,
however, fall short. Both approaches seem still to eschew considera-
tion of the subjective dimension of "fear," while seemingly focusing
on the "well-founded" adjective, as if it said "well-founded likely-
hood." While judges and adjudicators may be more comfortable
applying seemingly objective standards-such as the likelihood of
persecution, the reasonableness of the fear and the reasonable
possibility of it occurring- in determining whether the claimant has a
"well-founded fear," objective standards should not be exclusive and
much more emphasis on the subjective nature of the claimant's fear,
credibility in expressing it, and credibility of the persecution to the
claimant's category of people in his or her homeland seems war-
ranted. While the current standard, a "reasonable possibility of
persecution" is a lower hurdle of the level of risk to demonstrate than
"clear probability of persecution, it remains still objective in nature,
and does not require decision-makers to consider subjective factors.
However, the "reasonable possibility" standard directs courts and
adjudicators to consider the individual claimant's personal physical
connection to actual persecution, the likelihood that she herself will
be singled out for persecution upon return, and the judge or
adjudicator's view of the reasonableness of the claimants' claimed
fear of likely persecution, rather than the claimant's actual fear of
persecution. In applying such a standard both the reason and
123 Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 445 (B.I.A. 1987) (adopting the Fifth
Circuit's definition of "well-founded fear" set forth in Guevara-Flores, 786 F.2d at
1250). While the BIA paid lip service to the Supreme Court's mandate for
subjectivity in the determination of a "well-founded fear," in actuality the standard
adopted in Mogharrabi is an objective inquiry. Valle-Zometa v. INS, No. 88-7174,
1990 WL 208725, at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 1990).
124 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(B) (2010).
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discretion of a judge are all too easily subtly affected by personal
preferences and other non-germane factors. A credible fear based in
the reality of the circumstances on the ground, persecution against
persons in the claimants category in the home country, would be
well-founded, whether or not this individual claimant can prove a
likelihood that he or she has been singled out for persecution or
whether or not there is a one in ten chance that he or she would be. If
the circumstances on the ground make it clear that arbitrary or regu-
lar persecution of persons in the claimant's particular category occur,
and the fear expressed by the claimant is connected to that reality,
even if in the adjudicator's view there is a less than five or ten percent
chance that this claimant would actually suffer the persecution, other
elements being met, asylum should be granted. This seems to be the
plain meaning of the phrase "well founded fear of persecution."
Certainly the framers of the Convention were capable of including
language suggesting that some objective level of likelihood of
persecution of the particular claimant was required. They did not.
A standard that reduces or takes the "measuring of proba-
bility" discretion away from the adjudicator will also lead to more
consistent, predictable and fair asylum adjudications. Decision-
makers should be encouraged to recognize the many factors
producing the subjective reality of the claimant in relation to the
objective reality of the facts on the ground.
In the U.S., even with rather firm agreement on the currently
accepted meaning of the "well-founded fear of persecution
standard," demonstrating a reasonable possibility of persecution-
applying the standard to a very wide variety of facts and circum-
stances, and to claimants of different political opinions, different
nationalities, different races, religions and "particular social groups,"
- has led to very inconsistent results, and thus serious issues of
fairness and justice. 125
125 Between January 2000 and July 2004, asylum grant rate for Chinese claimants in
Atlanta's Immigration Court was 7%, whereas 400 miles south in Orlando, Florida,
the rate for Chinese asylum grants was 76%. Nationwide it was 47%. On the other
hand, the average rate for Haitians was only twenty percent. RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 33-37.
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VI. SOME SUGGESTIONS
There are of course other important elements used in
determining whether a claimant should be awarded asylum. Clear
and just definitions of what constitutes "persecution" and "mem-
bership in a particular social group," or "political opinion" in asylum
determinations are vital to many claimants and the states in which
they seek to stay, and deserve considerable attention. For the
moment, it is enough to say that there are two major areas of reform
that need to be addressed by EU and U.S. policy-makers. First, both
the EU and U.S. need to further refine the applicable legal standards
for establishing asylee status. These standards must be just and
hopefully reduce the amount of discretion exercised by asylum
adjudicators. More clearly defining a claimant's burden of proving a
"well-founded fear of persecution," in a way that removes emphasis
from the probabilities of risk of persecution is critical. U.S. courts and
regulators, and their EU counterparts, must better define that burden
in a way that focuses upon the subjective character of fear and that
reduces the breadth of judicial discretion that comes with measuring
the probability of persecution in a so-called wholly objective frame of
reference.
Justice Stevens was headed in the right direction when he
emphasized:
[T]he reference to "fear" in the § 208(a) standard obvious-
ly makes the eligibility determination turn to some ex-
tent on the subjective mental state of the alien. "The
linguistic difference between the words 'well-founded
fear' and 'clear probability' may be as striking as that
between a subjective and objective frame of reference
.... "That the fear must be well-founded does not alter
the obvious focus on the individual's subjective beliefs,
nor does it transform the standard into a "more likely
than not" one.126
126 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted); see also Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 221 (B.I.A. 1985)
("'Fear' is a subjective condition, an emotion characterized by the anticipation or
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While proving a "reasonable possibility of persecution" is a
lower threshold and perhaps more just than the "clear probability of
persecution" standard for withholding of deportation, it still engages
the judge and prosecutor in the exercise of measuring the "likeli-
hood" of persecution. For the judge or adjudicator who is reluctant to
grant asylum it offers a more free "exercise of discretion," usually to
the detriment of the fearful claimant. It pulls the inquiry away from
the claimant's subjective fear and increases the affect of the judge's
biases on the outcome, even where there is a real effort to be objec-
tive. The exercise of broader discretion in terms of evaluating the
likelihood of the risk of persecution, is very likely to be affected by
other non-germane factors, such as the location of the adjudicator, the
location of the state, the particular nationality of the claimant, or even
the gender or age of the adjudicator.127 For instance, the proximity of
Greece to troubled regions near the eastern end of the Mediterranean
Sea likely affects the exercise of judgment on asylum claims in
Greece.
This subjective fear component ought to depend largely on a
claimant's own expression of fear of persecution, and the objective
reality of (1) his or her membership in one of the five categories for
protection under the refugee definition and (2) the circumstances of
persecution or threats of persecution of the claimant's group on the
ground in his or her home country. This analysis would lead to more
certain and predictable asylum eligibility determinations by reducing
the breadth of discretion of the decision-makers, and effect of other
non-germane factors.
Some may object that eliminating an evaluation of the likeli-
hood of the individual claimants' own persecution lowers the
threshold too much, and that doing so would only add to the number
of asylum claimants and asylees, in turn increasing the fear of
national citizens and heightening their reluctance to receive them.
However, if immigrants are effectively integrated, 128 citizens will
awareness of danger." (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
831 (16th ed. 1971)).
127 See RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., supra note 6, at 47.28 This of course means paying heightened attention to the language, cultural, and
political education and engagement of immigrants.
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note that the well-being of their national identity, culture, social,
political, and economic life is strengthened rather than harmed, and
their visceral concerns over security will readily transform itself into
a hospitality that embraces asylees. "Secure" citizens will not fear a
legal threshold that accepts asylees where it is clear that circum-
stances in a claimant's homeland have produced persecution of
others in the claimant's category. Under these circumstances, even if
the individual claimant need not prove some likelihood or reasonable
possibility that he or she will be singled out for persecution in the
event of return, the lack of the extra element of proof would not
trouble the "secure" citizen. So long as the individual claimant
expresses a credible subjective fear that is based on the reality of
circumstances on the ground in her home country, and she is a
member of the category that is subject to persecution or threat of it,
she should be granted asylum under the "well-founded fear of
persecution" standard.
In addition, with clear definitions of the categories of
refugees-race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion 29 - there will be much more
predictability as to who is a refugee. While it may, as noted, result in
higher numbers of recognized refugees, this will be a just result.
Furthermore, if the claimants are clearly members of the persecuted
class in their respective homelands, it will also be more acceptable in
the secure sovereign state.
The standard offered here is not only much closer to what the
"well-founded fear" standard embraces, a subjective fear felt by one of
a group of particular people who are persecuted or who are
threatened with persecution, but it also aligns better with the
embrace of hospitality by national citizens. Citizens secure in their
own well-being are likely more secure with predictable bases for the
admission of others into their spaces of freedom.
The second important area of reform has to do with who
makes asylum determinations and where they are made. So long as
humans are making judgments concerning sharing their privileges
with others who look and act differently, we will not have a perfect
129 Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1.
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system to adjudicate asylum claims. And there is of course no
necessary moral content to consistency and predictability. A consis-
tent and predictable system that always leads to "No" or "Yes" is not
necessarily a good or just system. However, where the content of
standards, such as meeting the definition of a refugee, are just, and
amenable to more consistent and predictable adjudication, then the
fair application of those standards by competent professionals, not
pervasively influenced by local attitudes, is more likely to be good
and just, and accepted by national citizens and asylees alike. The
assurance that competent professionals adjudicate asylum claims is
as critical as the consistency and justness of the standard applied.
Professional competence in all asylum adjudication is neces-
sary to substantially reduce the introduction of adjudicator, national
or geographic preferences and other factors non-germane to the
adjudication process. Hopefully, broadly administered education,
training and selection, loyalty to the profession and the shared values
of peer professionals would help override more locally developed
attitudes and other non-germane preferences in their work.
Still, the preservation of integrity of national sovereign,
especially in the EU, is also critical.130 For example, rather than
eliminate some of the non-germane factors influencing asylum
determinations in Greece by using non-Greek judges, or judges
situated outside of Greece, it needs to be recognized that the national
citizens of Greece, or other Member States, clearly enjoy the full right
and responsibility to decide who may or may not enter and reside in
their state and that, with limited exceptions not relevant here,
authority over one's national territory resides in the sovereign state
130 As we have seen, concerns about EU expansion and perceived Islamist threats to
cultural and national identity, encroachments upon national sovereignty, were likely
significant factors in the "no" votes of France and the Netherlands in 2002 on the
proposed EU Constitutional Treaty, and concerns about traditional Irish neutrality in
foreign policy, a key aspect of national sovereignty, was a significant element in
Ireland's initial vote against ratification on the Lisbon Treaty. More recently, the
decision to administer "economic governance" by the EU's Council of Ministers
over Member State banks' required participation in a bailout loan program for
Greece, raised serious national sovereignty encroachment concerns among Member
States. See Stephen Castel & Matthew Saltmarshe, Europeans Reach Deal On
Rescue For Greece, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at B1, B4.
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alone. 131 Thus, adjudication over asylum claimants in Greece must be
done by competent Greek professionals and judges in Greece, and
those in France, by French professionals in France. But Greece,
France, and Sweden, among others, can also well agree to more
refined standards for adjudicating asylum claims and to a system for
training, hiring, and monitoring competent national professionals
under EU-wide standards and with the help of EU institutions.
These Member States can also agree that while harmony,
consistency and predictability are very desirable qualities to have in
the common EU asylum process, an equitable sharing of the burdens
of responsibility is also essential. No state in a European Union
dedicated to Free Movement of Persons132 and equality of oppor-
tunity for all European citizens should be expected to carry the lion's
share and heaviest burden of taking on legitimate asylees. Those in
the north of Europe, furthest from the homelands of claimants and
refugees, must fully share in the responsibility for taking care of
asylees with those states that are more vulnerable at the frontiers of
the EU system, such as Greece. Ensuring that Greece's citizens, or
those of any vulnerable state, feel secure in their own national,
geographic, cultural, and economic well-being is particularly vital.
Only when Greek citizens really feel the robustness of their sovereign
state's protection of them, will they feel healthy enough to fully
exercise the hospitality that national citizens in a healthy state should
embrace.
With full participation of citizens, including academics,
judges and officials of all Member States in the EU, a system should
be developed and established that sets standards for and assists in
the hiring, training and professional development of all asylum
decision-makers and adjudicators, and sets standards for professional
competence and on-going evaluation of such professionals and
judges. While the details are better left to others, the system ought to
include as overall administrator, an independent executive agency
under the Presidency of the European Commission, and should
See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606-07 (1889).
32 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 65-73.
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include national and EU-wide asylum process review panels that
would be responsible for ensuring the consistency and predictability
of asylum determinations in and among Member States. Such panels
would have authority to visit and report on national adjudicative
systems to ensure compliance with standards, and to make recom-
mendations to Member State and EU-wide regulators. Such a system
should in time result in reasonably comparable levels of competency
and professionalism among decision-makers and adjudicators, and
substantial consistency and predictability in the asylum adjudication
process. Professional competence in applying the same standards,
refined to be more predictable and just, will add measurably to the
evenhandedness and ultimately the hospitality shown to asylum
claimants and asylees.
A similar system should be able to be put in place more easily
in the U.S., although, in view of the current situation, it should truly
be administered on a national level. In the U.S. it may be that while
standards, hiring and some training may currently be "national," it is
also quite political, and in the end much of that is "local." It is also
essential for the U.S. to adopt the same kind of new attention to
asylum standards as described above for the EU: competency;
training; professional development of decision-makers, adjudicators,
and judges; and both national and regionally-based monitoring and
compliance review.133
And, of course, in the U.S. there is far less danger of any
encroachment on national sovereignty that needs to be watched for.
However, given the current divided responsibility for asylum and
other immigration matters largely between the Department of
Homeland Security and the Justice Department (entities with signi-
ficant other responsibilities), it may be better for asylees, other non-
citizens, and ultimately for U.S. citizens that the suggested system be
part of a new independent, executive agency that can start from a
clean slate, at least with respect to incorporating the suggested
asylum adjudication system.
133 See generally RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., supra note 6, at 100-16 (providing
recommendations and commentary relating to immigration courts).
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The second significant process reform that is essential would
be to create in both the EU and U.S. systems that enable an equitable
geographic burden-sharing of asylee adjudications and awards of
asylum. This would perhaps reduce the perception of threat in states
and regions where refugees seek to enter in largest numbers and, as a
consequence, increase the likelihood of serious consideration of
asylum claims and hospitable treatment of asylees in these areas. This
process reform would require a carefully designed, data driven
system, whereby when a claimant makes a claim for asylum in a
Member State A of the EU or Region A of the U.S., the claimant-
receiving initial decision-maker or adjudicator in Member State or
Region A will be able to determine if her state or region should make
the determination, or whether because her state or region has had an
excess of claimants, the claimant's application should be rotated to a
an asylum claimant "deficient state." The initial decision-maker or
adjudicator in Member State A will first determine whether the
claimant represents an excess of greater than five percent of a
predetermined percentage of asylum claimants allocated to that
Member State or region, so long as the percentage of claimants
awarded asylum in the last three years is within ten percent of
predetermined percentage of asylum awards being granted over the
same period throughout the EU. The predetermined percentages of
claimants and awards should be a function of the proportion that the
population of the Member State or region bears to the population of
the entire EU or U.S. "Excess claimants" would then be allocated to
the closest state that is deficient in numbers of claimants and award-
ees under its predetermined percentages. Data and computations of
numbers of claimants, awardees, percentages for each and predeter-
mined percentages should be maintained in centrally administered
data bases where calculations would be made by EU or U.S.
professionals representing all Member States and regions.
The purpose here would be to allocate claimants largely on
the basis of EU Member State or U.S. region population, so long as
awards of asylum in any three year period is reasonably close (within
ten percent) to the numbers awarded in similarly sized Member
States or regions. In this way no Member State or region that may be
more vulnerable due to geography or other factors, such as Greece or
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Spain in the EU, would carry too large a burden. Knowing that their
asylum burden is shared by its distant sister Member States or
regions, the citizens of those states should feel substantially less
threatened. They will have greater confidence in their government's
ability to protect their economic, social, cultural, and national well-
being, and should be much more likely to embrace their new arrivals
with natural hospitality.
This system would also ensure that traditionally less recep-
tive Member States and regions will carry their fair and just share of
the perceived burden of effectively evaluating asylum claims and
offering hospitable treatment to those who come to their shores
because they do have a fear of persecution based upon Geneva
Convention standards, because of (1) a new level of EU and U.S.
developed competence, training, hiring, professionalism, and profes-
sional colleagueship and (2) monitoring the numbers and percentages
of actual awards of asylum,.
These two significant reforms would also mesh well with the
"Dublin Process." 134 In the Dublin process, once the appropriate
official determines on the basis of family reunification, residence
permit, length of residence, place of entry or other basis where a
claimant should have her application for asylum considered, that
official would then be able to consult the data bank calculation in
order to determine to which Member State if any other than the
present one, the claimant should be sent to for adjudication.
Although the author has not analyzed here all the Dublin criteria in
relation to this determination, the author would think that to the
extent that the primary Dublin criteria, such as family reunification
and residence,135 come into play in the determination, they would
ordinarily be deemed to trump the predetermined percentage
allocation described herein, other than when Dublin leads to the
return of the claimant to the Member State of entry, in which cases
the predetermined percentage calculations would be determinative.
134 See Council Regulation No. 343/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1, 1 (EC).
135 Id. at 1, 2, 4, 5.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The two goals of these process reforms, along with the
refinement of the "well-founded fear" standard are: (1) to ensure that
the standard and the application process is more just, more equitably
shared, and better reflects the purpose of the refugee right, and (2) to
ensure that these critical dimensions of protecting refugees reinforce
and respect national sovereignty and citizenship. These goals seek to
add more certainty, consistency, and predictability to the application
of the standard and to the award process, and to ease the concerns
and strengthen the confidence of national citizens. The broader goal
is to open the twenty-first century to a security and confidence-based
hospitality in hosting and sharing with refugees our spaces of
freedom.
Other improvements are also needed concerning non-citizens
coming to our lands and the treatment of immigrants, migrants, and
other non-citizens, particularly with respect to the establishment of
priorities. These improvements too should respect national sover-
eignty and national citizenship, buttressing the confidence of citizens
in the security of their citizenship's essential attributes, and at the
same time be consistent, predictable, and just in the application of
such priorities and treatment as part of the welcoming hospitality of
citizens as hosts.
The recommendations made here may well be imperfect.
They are offered in the hope that they lead to consideration of asylum
protection approaches that do justice and share burdens among
healthy states, that respect national sovereignty and citizenship, and
that lead in the end to genuine hospitality, sharing our spaces of
freedom with sisters and brothers from around the world who find
themselves among us.
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